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Chapter 1
Introduction
Decay or degradation of materials has been primarily discussed in the fields of
engineering, chemistry, and biology. Topics include the failure points of materials used
in construction, the capabilities of batteries to hold a charge, and the reduced efficiency
of medications. Another example is digital imagery due to a loss of information points,
because the decay of pixels in a digital graphic .jpg file leads to a blurred image
(citation).
Data decay in the fields of education, social and behavioral science, and political
sciences, however, remain unchartered areas. For example, there are no current
models of data degradation as it relates to criminal justice or its subfields of counterterrorism and intelligence. Consumers of counter-terrorism and intelligence information,
such as the Department of Homeland Security in the United States, would benefit from
an exploratory analysis of the impact of data decay when dealing with predictive
analyses (i.e., regression methods).
Homeland security became a buzzword in the late twenty-first century. Fuelled
by the technological advances and the vulnerabilities of an interconnected and
interdependent global infrastructure, terrorism has become the “preferred tactic for
ideological extremists” (Joint Publication 3-26, 2009). Terrorism has changed
dramatically over the past decades in terms of perpetrator, ideology, tactics, and scope
of operation, culminating in the death of thousands.
Combating the threat of terrorism, workers at security agencies rely on
intelligence that consists of the collection of information, its analysis, and action on the
gained knowledge. Information is collected from various open and covert sources and is
stored by their representative agencies after it has been scanned for important or
predictive markers.
Unfortunately, sometimes the stored information is faulty, incomplete, or is
information that - at one point in time – was correct but subsequently decayed. Hence,
quantitative research methodologies, regardless of their sophistication, may yield less
than optimal outcomes. For example, intelligence failures, such as the inability to
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predict or prevent the attacks of September 11, 2001 on the twin towers of the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United States exposed the limitation of
compartmental intelligence warehousing. It was asserted that the limitations were
fueled by the rivalry between the different services, and restrictive policies and laws
(9/11 Commission, 2004). However, no information service, within its own jurisdiction,
held sufficient (or sufficiently correct) information (9/11 Commission, 2004).
The creation of joint agency fusion centers and the Joint Terrorism Task Forces
(JTTF) aimed to facilitate the sharing of intelligence, the collaboration between agencies
and the pooling of different databases. This is referred to as terrorism informatics
(Chen, et al., 2008). Informatics has also been developed in other arenas, including
bioinformatics, health informatics, and human services informatics. Ultimately, interagency barricades and public policies should no longer prevent the information flow
necessary to predict or prevent major terrorist acts. Nevertheless, exploratory
intelligence analysis based on statistical analysis of raw data is still in its infancy and no
published sources exist on the effectiveness of statistical models when confronted with
massively decayed data.
Moreover, what constitutes intelligence analysis verses its predecessors as
constituent parts is subject to debate, as Angrell (2002) stated that “information
processing, information screening, and informatics are sometimes described as
intelligence analysis, which they are not” (p. 6). Angrell (2002) also noted that veteran
analysts work hard “to see, with an intuitive ability, potential intelligence values” (p. 5).
Security
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created by an act of the
United States Congress in November, 2002, in part, to ameliorate the flow in interagency information. Due to the urgency brought about due to global threats, it became
operational only four months later. Its mission is to integrate twenty-two federal
departments and agencies into a single, comprehensive department to secure the
United States from threats.
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Similarly, other departments and agencies exist that are charged with protection
from threats. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the United
States Marshal Service (USMS) within the Department of Justice are concerned with
domestic threats, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is concerned with foreign
threats.
The security infrastructure in the United States is mirrored by similar structures
around the world. For example, in Germany the overarching service for foreign threats
is the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) which is under the auspices of the Chancellor’s
Office, and Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) domestic intelligence agency which
is under the Federal Ministry of the Interior. In Israel, the Sherut haBitachon haKlali
(Shin Bet) is charged with internal threats and the Mossad handles foreign intelligence
services. In the United Kingdom, Military Intelligence (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence
Service (MI6), both under the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), deal with internal and
foreign security, respectively. Each country’s internal security infrastructure also
provides for state militias, state police forces, municipal sheriff and police forces,
firefighters, park rangers, and emergency medical personnel. Their collective purposes
are to provide front line or ancillary assistance in response to domestic security
concerns.
Counter-Terrorism
Counter-terrorism has been defined as the “actions to inhibit terrorism attacks or
curtail their consequences” (Enders & Sandler, 2012, p. 103). In this capacity, security
agencies are confronted with a myriad of obstacles including the absence of a single
definition of terrorism and constant change of threat scenarios. However, the definition
of a terrorist act has not been universally accepted.
This confusion of definitional distinctions has not been without a debilitating
impact. For example, in the United States, despite a pledge to work closely together,
the different political, law enforcement, and defense agencies remain unable to agree
on a single definition of terrorism. Hence, administrators of the agencies have
developed their own definitions, interpretations, and methods of approaching terrorism,

4

which has been influenced by specifics priorities and outlooks of the agency involved
(Hoffman, 1999). This inconstancy limits the cooperation between the different local,
state, and federal agencies.
On a global stage, the lack of a single definition of terrorism is further
exacerbated with respect to the cooperation among the security agencies between
different countries. Surveying scholars around the world, Schmid and Jongman (1988)
found 109 definitions. More recently, Weinberg’s et al. (2004) literature review found 73
definitions of terrorism.
Moreover, even defining terrorism among terrorist groups is a difficult task. In
order to win and maintain a support base, terrorist groups have tried to rid themselves
of any negative connotation with terrorism and hide behind semantic camouflage,
describing themselves as freedom fighters or urban guerrillas. These semantic debates
have been especially noticeable in the news media. In an effort to appear neutral,
reporters in the news media often have used terms such as terrorist and freedom
fighter interchangeably to describe the perpetrators. Due to this ambiguousness,
Hoffman (1999) noted that there is no widely accepted definition of terrorism (p. 37).
Areas of Activity
Over the past century, security professionals witnessed a change in the ideology
and tactics of terrorists and terrorist organizations ranging from the early Russian
anarchists in the 1890s to the current religious terrorism around the globe. Rapoport
(2004) indicated the existence of four defined terrorist ideologies (referred to as wave
theory). Hoffman (1999) noted similar changes in terrorism ideology and tactics,
defining them as: 1) ethno-nationalist/separatist, 2) international, 3) religious, and 4)
state-sponsored terrorism.
Terrorist attacks can occur in four areas: 1) Land, 2) Air, 3) Maritime, and 4)
Cyberspace. Terrorist strategies and tactics are governed by their respective ideologies
and by the availability and vulnerably of desired targets. As rational decision makers,
terrorists weigh the benefits of an action (probability of success and gained publicity)
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while trying to minimize potential risks. Thus, with the hardening of high value targets
such as government installations, terrorists move to more vulnerable targets of choice.
Information and Intelligence
Intelligence consists of the collection of information, its analysis, and action on
the gained knowledge (Gilboa, 2012). Information is collected from various overt and
covert sources. Classified information is what a government deems sensitive and vital
for its operation. Gaining access to these protected information requires the use of
covert interception by either an agent (HUMINT, or human intelligence) or though
technological means (e.g., SIGINT, or signal intelligence).
Open Source intelligence (OSINT) and information are publicly available and can
include media sources such as newspapers, television, and user generated content (e.g.
social networking and sharing sites). Another important source for OSINT are databases
from governmental, business, academic, and non-profit organizations (e. g., Census,
Equifax).
Automatic data interception and processing rates have quadrupled over the past
decade. It is estimated to occur at a rate of over 20 terabytes per minute (Bamford,
2012). Fed by geostationary satellites and domestic and international listening posts,
the National Security Authority (NSA) alone requires five substations and more than a
million square feet of digital storage. The new datacenter in Bluffdale, Utah will serve as
the center of the NSA’s cloud-based management strategy. It is estimated to cost US$ 2
billion (Bamford, 2012). This increasing availability of information changed the
intelligence analysis from “a process of stitching together parse data to derive
conclusions to a process of extracting conclusions from aggregation and distillation of
massive data and data reflections" (Farber, et al., n.d.).
Quality of Data and its Analysis
The concern with corruption in data is “one of the oldest and most fruitful lines
of statistical investigation,” (Fisher, 1925, p. i). Grace and Sawilowsky (2009) noted that
the principle of Garbage In – Garbage Out (GIGO), which emerged from the early days
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of programming electronic computers, is a major threat to meaningful data analysis.
Corruption emerges from a variety of sources and for a variety of reasons. For example,
a datum may be transformed via a keystroke error from a meaningful value into an
outlier (i. e., beyond expected minimum or maximum values) or an inlier (i. e., hidden
by being placed toward the median), it may become auto-correlated, or it may split into
mixed-distributions.
Although there were sporadic attempts to handle corrupt data in the early 20th
century, the most comprehensive practical treatment of the statistical analysis of
corrupt data was known as the “1972 Princeton Study” (Andrews, et al., 1972). It was a
collection of Monte Carlo studies on a variety of statistical procedures to determine (1)
the impact with regard to Type I error and other statistical properties due to corrupt
data, and (2) the initiation of the search for methods that were robust to corrupt data.
With regard to linear regression, for example, their modest conclusion was “next to
nothing is known about how to robustize regression procedures with respect to errors in
the Cij (Huber, 1972, p. 1062).” Robustize, or to make robust, referred to the ability of
the regression method to preserve the false positive error rate to the threshold set by
nominal alpha when the data are sampled from a source that does not meet the
distribution (e.g., normality) or other underlying requirements (e.g., homoscedasticity)
of the statistic.
However, the “Princeton Study” served as a Sputnik moment, and propelled
many workers toward the development of solutions to this problem. Statistical methods
were developed that could be shown to be robust, at least according to some local
definition, to the impact of corrupt data. For example, with regard to linear regression,
within a decade, Brown (1982) reviewed the flurry of studies, numbering over a dozen,
conducted to determine methods of making regression robust to outliers. Brown offered
the BML (or β maximum likelihood) method, which was specific to the presence of a
form of an outlier called “one-wild” (p. 74). More modern approaches are the leasttrimmed squares and resistant regression methods (Verzani, 2004, p. 100). (These
forms of corrupt data are further discussed in Chapter 2.)
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Linear Regression
An entry level objective method that is useful in explaining variance, or in
predicting future status, value, or location is simple linear regression. This is a least
squares method of the form

Y =' a + β X 1 ,

(1)

where Y’ is the predicted outcome or dependent variable, a is the Y-intercept, β is a
standardized weight (although in the case of simple linear regression such as (1), the
unstandardized weight b is equivalent), and X is the independent variable. A test of β1 is
essentially a test of the veracity of X1. Thus, testing the null hypothesis Ho: β = 0
against the alternative hypothesis Ha: β ≠ 0 is a test to determine if Y can be regressed
by X in order to either explain or predict variance. The n-2 df t-test is applied to β, and
if the null is rejected, then X is considered useful as an explanatory or a predictive
independent variable for Y. (Note that the independent samples t test on X and Y can
be accomplished by dummy coding group membership and then conducting Eq. (1).)
After testing for the significance of β, the next step in linear regression is to evaluate
the explained R2.
It is a straightforward matter to extend simple linear regression to multiple linear
regression through the introduction of a second, third, or more independent variables
(see, e. g., Hair, et al., 2006, Chapter 4). This introduces a variety of complexities, such
as the order of entry (i. e., if the independent variables are hierarchical), method of
entry (e. g., stepwise if no a priori hypothesis exists, forward entry, backwards
removal), the degree that various independent variables are correlated with the
dependent variable and with each other, homogeneity of regression slopes,
independence of error terms, and residual analyses.
All of these complexities become exacerbated due to the presence of decayed
data. Therefore, a necessary first step prior to evaluating the robustness (e. g., with
respect to Type I error for departures from population normality) of a regression
technique is to first ascertain whether the method is successful in simple linear
regression when the underlying distribution is normally distributed prior to decay.
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In terms of outliers, in simple linear regression there are “outliers in the
univariate sense – a data point that doesn’t fit the pattern set by the bulk of the data”
(Verzani, 2004, p. 98). There is also a second type, which are “outliers in the regression
model” that are “data points that are far from the trend or pattern of the data”
(Verzani, 2004, p. 98).
The presence of a one-wild outlier is an example of an outlier in the univariate
sense. Outliers in the regression can be modeled by more sophisticated types of decay.
Although there is not a uniform definition of data decay, this form of corruption can be
expressed as a censoring or missing values, as well as any other conceivable way to
weaken or stress the initial variable with respect to Type I error.
In terms of robustness with respect to Type II error, a straightforward method of
decaying data can be invoked when creating correlated data with methods that do not
preserve distributional properties. For example, the algorithm

y =rx + z 1 − r 2

(2),

given in Sawilowsky and Fahoome (2003, p. 295) for producing correlated data “does
not provide for controlling skew, γ1 and kurtosis, γ1” (p. 300). Note that (2) pertains to
data samples from the Gaussian distribution. In this sense, those descriptive statistics
(skew and kurtosis) in the original data set have decayed during the production of
correlated data. Hence, (2) is a desirable method for correlating data if the objective is
to model decay, because it will produce the desired degree of correlation while
arbitrarily modifying the initial values of skew, kurtosis, and higher moments.
Unfortunately, a review of the development of robust regression methods by
Brown (1982) showed that none of the techniques were evaluated for an onslaught of
severe corruption and decay. For example, the simultaneous introduction of censuring,
missing values, and poorly correlated data

were not the subject of any of the

investigations mentioned by Brown (1982).
New robust regression techniques have been developed that are far more
sophisticated than adaptations to regression models based on minor perturbations;
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these are called least-trimmed and resistant regression. However, their robustness
properties in the presence of massively decayed data are not yet known.
Purpose of the study
Given the potential state of massive and varied data decay models in security
studies, and the historical fact that robust regression techniques were developed under
simple or singular forms of data corruption or decay, the purpose of this study is to
compare least-trimmed and resistant regression in the simple linear regression model.
This will provide useful information in determining which - if either - method is useful in
predicting future status, value, or location of assets in security studies. If one or both
are successful, recommendations can then be made to extend the technique(s) to more
complicated general linear models, beginning with multiple linear regression, to
informatics in other arenas (e.g., education, social and behavioral sciences).
Research Hypothesis
This study is designed to investigate the use of least-trimmed (lqs()) and
resistant (rlm()) simple linear regression in the N-2 df t-test test of β as methods to
preserve the Type I error rate and Type II error rate for data decay models that
potentially may appear in small samples terrorism informatics and security data.
Although an exhaustive comparative power analysis would be premature, the
introduction of various levels of correlated data will simulate the impact of simple
effects, and will provide a glimpse of the competitiveness of lqs() and rlm() with the
ordinary least squares (lm()) regressions.
Importance of the Study
Simple linear regression, and its extension to multiple linear regression, is the
initial choice when the data are known not to be curvilinear for modeling. However,
there are classical data distribution requirements that are rarely met that may adversely
impact the general linear model. The backdrop of this study is on modeling in the field
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of homeland security intelligence and informatics, but the principles apply equally to
education, social and behavioral sciences, and related disciplines.
Currently, the state of the art in regression modeling is limited to data that are
noncompliant in the sense that they contain mild perturbations from normality. In real
intelligence situations, as in related disciplines, however, the data rarely arrive in such a
pristine condition. Therefore, the importance of this study is to determine if modern
robust and resistant regression methods are robust to realistic data decay in the simple
linear layout. If so, the next step would be to investigate more complex regression
models.
Operation Definitions
Least-trimmed mean. Least trimmed means regression is a technique that
follows the least-squares regression method, except the sum of squared residuals are
replaced with the “sum of the q smallest squared residuals, where q is roughly n/2”
(Verzani, 2004, p. 100), which essentially is an M (maximum likelihood) estimator. It is
invoked in R via the lqs() function located in the MASS package.
Maximum likelihood regression. This is a form of resistant regression, invoked via
the rlms() function located in the MASS package, is equivalent to the lqs() function,
except that the method can be changed from M (maximum likelihood) to other
probability models.
Power. Power is the ability to reject a false null hypothesis. Although this study
does not present a systematic comparative power analysis, the comparison of Type II
error rates will give an indication of typical power comparisons.
Terrorism informatics. Terrorism informatics is defined as “the application of
advanced methodologies and information fusion and analysis techniques to acquire,
integrate, process, analyze, and manage the diversity of terrorism-related information
for national/international and homeland security-related applications” (Chen, 2000, p.
xv).
Type I error. A Type I error is defined as the false positive rate (Sawilowsky &
Fahoome, 2003, p. 157.) It refers to rejecting the null hypothesis when in fact it is true.
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Type II error. A Type II error is the failure to reject a false null hypothesis. A
parametric statistic is considered robust with respect to Type II error when the rejection
rate under assumption violations produces approximately the same rejection rate in the
absence of those violations.
Limitations
A limitation of this study pertains to the models of decayed data. In terms of
Type I errors it will be limited to various models of censoring and missing data in terms
of Type II errors (and comparative power) it will be limited to treatments model as
correlated data, and the multi-generational correlation (i. e, invoking of Eq. (2) four
times to produce Y values) using Eq. (1) (meaning the data will originate from a
Gaussian distribution prior to being decayed).
The lqs and rlm routines available in R’s MASS library produce the y intercept,
beta, and other summary statistics. However, neither produces the p value associated
with beta. The reason is because the t test (or Z test for large samples) on beta is
defined as beta divided by the standard error of beta, which is then associated with the
df = N – 2 for the t distribution (which asymptotically converges with the Z
distribution). It is generally not optimal to use the normal theory formula for the
standard error (i.e., the standard deviation divided by the sample size) because it is not
robust to non-normally distributed data (including decayed data). There are potential
alternatives, such as the winsorized sample standard deviation, or a jackknife or
bootstrap approximation (see, e.g., Sawilowsky & Fahoome, 2003, p. 22, 376 - 382).
However, there are many limitations to those alternatives. Although Wilcox (1996), for
example, provided such alternatives in computing the standard error for other
hypothesis tests (e.g., the sample median), he first presented a test using the robust
estimator combined with the normal curve theory standard error (see, e.g., p. 120).
Hence, in this dissertation, the p value associated with beta will be determined with the
normal curve theory standard error, despite the fact robust methods (i.e., lqs and rlm)
will be used to determine the value of beta. When the statistical literature settles on an
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optimal robust standard error, this study should be replicated using it to determine the
p value associated with beta.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Whether terrorist organizations conduct attacks depends on two factors:
motivation and capabilities. If both indexes are high (i.e., above a certain threshold), it
is likely that a terrorist organization will conduct an attack. Attacking when only one of
these two factors is present poses a security services risk, that is, a boomerang effect in
which an insufficient attack on a group’s capabilities results in an escalation of terror
activities as the motivation level rises, and vice versa. Thus, a successful counterterrorism policy will concurrently address both the motivation and capabilities of a
terrorist organization (Ganor, 2005).
Terrorist Motivation
Group Motivation
From a historical perspective, the prominence of the long term (strategic)
motivation of terrorist groups has changed over time. Rapoport (2004) described this
condition as waves and coined the term “wave theory”, in which terrorist groups’
ideologies and tactics evolve based on the given socio-economic environment. Although
Rapoport (2004) indicated the existence of four distinct waves (anarchist, anti-colonial,
international, religious), other researchers have developed their own terrorist
typographies based on actor, purpose, motivational, or geographic factors. Complicated
by the lack of a universal definition and the multitude of variables found in terrorism,
Ganor (2011) noted that “very few typologies actually meet this goal and succeed in
forging a connection between a certain category and terrorists’ behavior” (p. 270).
Although Thornton (1964) and Shultz (1978) distinguished between two groups
employing terrorism, those in power (i.e., enforcement terror) and those aspiring power
(i.e., agitational terror), most terrorist typologies primarily deal with sub-state actors
only. Examples of terrorist typologies include:
•

Crenshaw (1981): revolutionist, nationalists, separatists, reformists,
anarchists, and reactionaries;

•

Gurr (1989): vigilante, insurgent, single-issue, separatist, and revolutionary;

14

•

Hoffman (1999): ethno-nationalist/separatist, international, religious, and
state-sponsored;

•

Laqueur (1999): far rightist, religious, state, exotic, and criminal;

•

Wilkinson (2001): nationalism, separatism, racism, vigilantism, ultra-left
ideology, religious fundamentalism, millennialism, and single-issue;

•

Barkan and Snowden (2001): vigilante, insurgent, transnational, and state;

•

Cronin (2003): leftist, rightist, ethno-nationalist/separatist, and scared;

•

Rapoport (2004): anarchist, anti-colonial, international, and religious;

•

Vasilenko (2004): political, separatist, nationalist, religious, and criminal;

•

Post (2008): social-revolutionary, right-wing, nationalist-separatist, religiousextremist, and single-issue;

•

Martin (2009): state, dissident, religious, criminal, and international; and

•

Ganor (2011): revolutionary, national liberation, social, separatist, radical
ideological, and religious.

State or state-sponsored terrorism, also known as enforcement terrorism, is the
use of force or the threat of violence by a state or state sponsored organization to
pursue specific policy objectives. State terrorism describes the direct involvement of a
state’s agency in the terrorism activities against internal and external opposition. Statesponsored terrorism describes indirect involvement by either providing save heavens,
financial, and operational resources, or using third party terrorist groups to conduct
attacks (and take responsibility for them). State-sponsored activities provide the
advantage that - not only can the state actor now bring pressure against its opponent
without being directly implicit in the act, but terrorist groups also have fewer constraints
because they do not have to rely on local support of the population (Shultz, 1978;
Ganor, 1997; Hoffman, 1999).
Criminal terrorism, defined as either the use of terror to eliminate rivals in a
profit-oriented environment (Vasilenko, 2004) or the use of criminal activity to sustain a
terrorist organization (Martin, 2009), do not fit the casus belli (i.e., definition) of a
political goal. Therefore, discussing the different ideologies, Crenshaw’s (1981) and
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Ganor’s (2011) frameworks provided useful starting points as their extensive and broad
categories allow for the absorption of most of the motivations listed above.
1. Revolutionary Organizations use terrorism to change the fundamental sociopolitical foundation of a state and its government. Often influenced by radical
ideologies, these organizations act to change a nation’s regime or
government, for example, Peru’s Shining Path.
2. Social Organizations use terrorism to change in the socio-economic structure
of a nation, such as El Salvador’s Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
(Ganor, 2011). However, socio-economic ideas are often based in radical
ideologies which require a change of government. Therefore, social
organizations are often viewed as sub-group of revolutionary organizations
3. National Liberation Organizations use terrorism to achieve national
independence from a colonial or occupying force, such as the National
Liberation Front in Algeria and the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
(EOKA).
4. Separatist Organizations use terrorism to achieve independence (i.e.,
secession) for an ethnic or religious minority from a state. Examples include
the attacks of the National Liberation Front of Corsica against the French and
those of the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) against the government of Spain.
5. Radical Ideological Organizations use terrorism to spread their extremist
ideologies such as anarchism, communism, and fascism. Groups belonging to
this category include the Red Army Faction in Germany and the Italian Red
Brigade.
6. Reformist and Single Issue groups or individuals use terrorism to pressure an
organization or government to change a specific policy (but not to overthrow
the government). Bombings such as by the “right to life” (Bowie, 2005) or
against nuclear constructions sites (Crenshaw, 1981) are examples.
7. Reactionary Organizations use terrorism to prevent any change to the current
political, territorial or socio-economic structure, such as Northern Ireland’s
Ulster Defense Association.
8. Religious Organizations use terrorism to fulfill a divine duty (e.g., the will of
G-d) in order to dissemination of their religion, advance religious interests
including the creation of an area/state governed by religious beliefs, or to
defend their religion from perceived hostile sources. Although religious
terrorist groups can be found in many religions (e.g. Muslim, Christian) and
cults (e.g., Aum Supreme), it is primarily associated with Islamic groups such
as Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
Individual Motivation
The pathways for a person to join a terrorist organization can be quite diverse
due to the different types of catalysts, including: perceived injustice or humiliation,
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need for identity, and a need for belonging (Borum, 2011; McCormick, 2003).
Therefore, no one-size-fits-all approach exists in understanding the different
psychological factors that influence violent behaviors (Rogers, 2011). Among the
different schools of thought are: the psychoanalytical approach argues that terrorism is
an abnormal activity caused by a psychological disorder such as Absolutist/Apocalyptic,
Narcissism, and Paranoia. The cognitive approach views the use of terrorism as a
rational or logical choice of an individual based on their prior behaviors that can be
understood though Rational Choice Therapy or Humiliation-Revenge Theory. The social
approach suggests that extremist behaviors are primarily based on group memberships
and group identity (Rogers, 2011).
During the radicalization and indoctrination process a cognitive restructuring
occurs through de-individuation (i.e., diffusion of responsibility). By dehumanizing the
target (i.e., cultural devaluation), the recruit builds his/her moral justification for violent
acts. McCormick (2003) noted that the radicalization process can be viewed as the
“result of a dialectical process that gradually pushes an individual toward a commitment
to violence over time” (p. 492). Thus, the identity of the terrorist group becomes the
same as the person’s own, thereby fulfilling his/her need for belonging and becoming
homogeneous with the group. The person leaves any doubts behind and uses feelings
of alienation and grievances to morph into a committed group member by accepting the
justifications of the terrorist group. The possible radicalization process (see Figure 1)
was visualized by Lorenz (2011).
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Figure 1: Radicalization Pathways (Lorenz, 2011).

Religious extremist groups that have risen to the level of terrorism are one of the
main benefactors of crisis, such as civil wars or oppression by a state, as people are
attracted to their simplified definitions of good and evil, moral conviction, and religious
rituals. However, terrorists will require a constant reminder (i.e., reinforcement) to stay
on course (Borum, 2011; Bartol & Bartol, 2009; McCormick, 2003). Terrorist groups
have found that an early indoctrination process will yield stronger loyalty and
commitment to the terrorist organization. Therefore, some organizations such as
Hezbollah or Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have established educational
programs

that

range

from

baby

brigades

to

college

groups

(Love,

2010;

Ramasubramanian, 2004).
Terrorism Capabilities
Although long-term goals of terrorist groups or individual terrorists can be quite
diverse, all use terrorism to gain attention and/or recognition for their cause (Thornton
1964; Crenshaw 1981; Hoffman, 1998). Attacks can also occur for the following
reasons: remind the world of their existence and cause, disorientate the population by
interrupting their day to day life, eliminate internal or external opposition, provoke
reprisal by the state, or to build the moral of their own constituency (Thornton 1964).
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The timing and style of attack - such as demonstrative, destructive, and suicide
terrorism (Pape, 2003) - depend on the terrorists’ motivational index (e.g., cause and
desired outcome) and their capabilities.
Terrorists’ Modi Operandi
Acts of terrorism are perpetrated in four realms: land, air, maritime, and
cyberspace. These acts may be contained entirely within a designation, or may cross
boundaries from one modus operandi (M. O.) to another.
Land
Terrorist tactics on land include assassinations of high value political and
business executives. Assassinations occur through the use of explosives, small arms,
and poison. Targeted assassinations were the primarily tactics of the Nechaev
anarchists (Rapoport, 2004). Hostage taking and kidnapping are two means by which a
terrorist (or terrorist group) takes one or several individuals to be used as pawns in
political negotiations or to raise funds. The difference between a hostage situation and
a kidnapping is that, in the latter, the location of the hostage is unknown. Because of
their publicity, hostage and kidnapping scenarios were among the preferred means of
ethno-nationalist/separatist, and international terrorist organizations such as the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Red Army faction (RAF).
Bombings can be used in two tactical situations. Although both seek to gain
publicity for the cause of the perpetrator, in the first case the bombings of
governmental or iconic buildings by ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist organizations
often only cause property, idealistic and religious fanatics often use bombings to cause
nondiscriminatory mass damage and loss of life among the population. The rise of
religious terrorism expanded the target definition and calls for the use of unlimited and
unconstrained violence. The use of unconventional weapons such as chemical or
biological agents (e.g., Tokyo attacks by Aum Supreme), and the use of improvised
explosive devices together with suicide terrorism tactics have resulted in higher
numbers of casualties (Hoffman, 2006).
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Air
Terrorists have long realized the vulnerabilities of the global mass transportation
system. Aircraft have several vulnerabilities. Commercial aircraft carry a large number
of passengers in a confined space and rely on airports for fuel and to load and unload
passengers and cargo. Airports employ thousands to facilitate the operation of
commercial and private airplanes, the shipment of cargo, and the handling of
passengers. Security agencies are challenged daily to strike a balance between the
requirements of keeping an airport running efficiently and providing security for
travelers. Moreover, no one universal airport security mechanism exists, potentially
compromising aircrafts and its passengers.
Four types of terrorism attacks have occurred via air: Hijacking of aircraft by
international terrorist organizations such as the 1976 hijacking of Air France Flight 139
to Entebbe by terrorists of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP-EO)
and the German Revolutionäre Zellen; this was intended to gain the attention of the
international media as well as socio-economic concessions. Vulnerabilities in airports
security enabled Libyan agents to smuggle explosives onto Pan Am flight 103 (1988) in
an act of state-sponsored terrorism that cost the lives of 270 people. Aircraft are
especially vulnerable to Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and surface to air missiles
(SAMs) during takeoff and landing (e.g., Arkia flight in 2002) due to the low speed and
flight level of the aircraft. A hijacked aircraft can be turned into a human controlled
missile and potentially attack targets of high value political, economic and defense such
as the attacks in the United States on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on
9/11.
Maritime
Since the successful attack by the Provincial Irish Republican Army on the yacht
of Lord Mountbatten in 1979, maritime terrorism attacks have accounted for only 2% of
all terrorist attacks worldwide (Lorenz, 2007). Notable successes were perpetrated by Al
Qaeda on the USS Cole in 2000 and MV Limburg in 2002, by Abu Sayyaf on Super Ferry
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14 in 2004, and by Hezbollah on the INS Hanit in 2006. This demonstrated that neither
military nor commercial vessels are insulated from a well-designed maritime attack.
Lorenz (2007) noted that both maritime vessels and maritime installations (e.g.,
ports) are vulnerable from several types of attacks. Water-Borne Improvised Explosive
Device (WBIEDs) are small craft that are loaded with explosives and ramped into the
target by remote control or suicide bomber. Freighters with explosive laden containers
could be sunk in port or in a maritime channel (e.g., Straits of Malacca), costing the
port to close or requiring lengthy detours. Mines lain in busy maritime channels.
Underwater demolition teams such as divers using Swimmer Delivery Vehicles (SDVs).
Aircraft used as human missiles. Rocket attacks from sea to shore or reverse. Terrorists
using the maritime transportation means to board vessels to take hostages or attack
targets on shore.
Cyberspace
The internet is the new terrorist frontier. It has enabled instant, global access
and exchange of information for governments, business, and private individuals.
Although this digital frontier has enabled increased productivity and new academic and
commercial heights, it has also provided terrorist organizations the ideal breeding and
operational grounds.
Terrorist organizations use the internet for multiple purposes. The internet can
serve as a mean to disseminate propaganda, radicalize and indoctrinate followers, or
shape the media coverage about the organization or its actions. The increasing
availability and (potential) anonymity of the internet means terrorists are not required
to learn their craft in person from a teacher, but can gain the required knowledge via
guidebooks and videos hosted on what is referred to as the Dark-Web - hidden or nonindexed websites (Chen et al., 2004). The worldwide financial secondary service
providers (e. g., Western Union, PayPal) and virtual money markets (e.g., Bit Coin) are
not required to follow federal banking and security standards to prevent money
laundering. This often guarantees anonymity, requiring only a screen-name that
enables terrorists to collect and move funds worldwide. In addition, the internet has
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brought about a decrease in vulnerability within the command and file structure of the
terrorist organization itself. This has come about due to decentralization, and the ability
to communicate rapidly and accurately.
Given the reliance on the interconnectivity of the internet for business (from the
supply chain command to the stock market) and governmental needs, it is
understandable that cyberspace is not only a means to gather intelligence on possible
targets but also an inviting target in itself for terrorist organizations. Indeed, successes
of non-political hackers and “hacktivism,” defined as the use of hacking by political
activists (Weimann, 2005) have shown that these systems are vulnerable to attacks.
Moreover, given the technical knowledge and human capital requirements, cyber
terrorism is considerably less expensive than regular forms of terrorism.
Terrorism: A Changing World
Terrorist groups based on ethnic grounds such as nationalist and separatist
terrorist organizations gain their strength from their local ethnic communities and those
abroad (i.e., diaspora) by forging a singular identity based on history, national myths,
hero worship, and the use of language. This “built-in audience among their own
communal groups” (Byman, 1998, p. 151) poses both a strength as well as weakness,
as they cannot afford to alienate their support base. This often constricts their
operational and tactical options to achieve their clearly stated political and social
objectives (i.e., independence). Tactics include the attack of symbolic national targets
such as government, political, and economic buildings and personnel, while regularly
releasing warnings of imminent attacks. Most attacks have occurred within national
boarders and were intended to demoralize the local government and to win foreign
support to pressure on the local government to give into their demands. Winning the
hearts and minds is therefore of the utmost importance. Thus, using high-cost
strategies such as suicide terrorism were only used (e.g., LTTE) when high interests
were at stake that outweigh the potential alienation of their supporters and displayed as
the last mean of the weak (Byman, 1998; Hoffmann, 1998; Pape, 2003).

22

However, not all terrorists experience the same constraints. Religious terrorists,
also known as the fourth wave (Rapoport, 2004), derive their legitimacy from divine
commandments that are sanctioned by the (fundamentalist) clergy. Although religious
terrorist groups exist within many religions (e.g., Christian, Jewish, Muslim) and cults
(e.g., Aum Supreme), in recent history, it is primarily associated with Islamic groups.
From their point of view, Islam is threatened by perceived foreign (e.g., neocolonialism, secularism, and modernism) and internal (e.g., moderate Muslims)
influences that justify a reactive and defensive jihad. Guided by divine degree, Islamic
terrorist groups interpret their fight as an all-out-war without constraints based on
principles such as muqawamah (i.e., active resistance) and istishhad, which serves as
religious justification for self-sacrificing actions taken by a shaheed (i.e. martyr) on the
battlefield. Based on this world view (e.g., morals, legitimation), Islamic terrorist often
target large groups indiscriminately in order to cause mass casualties (Martin, 2006;
Hoffmann, 1998). According to White (2003), because religious terrorists answer to a
divine power, they “are not constrained by social norms” (p. 17).
Suicide/Homicide Terrorism
A hallmark of high casualty attacks are multiple, coordinated suicide bombings in
which a terrorist either uses explosives strapped to the body as a delivering vehicle or is
actively driving a vehicle improvised explosive device (e.g., car, truck, boat, airplane)
into a target before igniting the charge. By definition, a suicide attack requires the
death of the suicide terrorist. The fact that the terrorist (willingly) accepts their death, is
a so-called thinking bomb can adapt to situational changes, and does not require an
escape plan, makes the attack more likely to succeed and therefore has clear
advantages over other forms of terrorism (Pape. 2003; Ganor, 2000). Shay (2004)
added that upon recruitment, a potential shaheed (i.e., suicide terrorist) goes through
several conditioning stages, including: physical and emotional training, operational
preparations, and a farewell ceremony. After the attack, the terrorist organization will
use the media to disseminate propaganda videos and messages of the shaheed in order
to increase the psychological effects of the attack.

23

Although suicide terrorism is primarily discussed within the realm of religious
terrorism, Pape (2006; 2010) argued that it does not depend on religion (noting the
numerous suicide attacks by secular groups such as the LTTE in Sri Lanka or Christian
groups in Lebanon) but is primarily a strategic response to a foreign occupation. In
other words, suicide terrorism occurs when a foreign military force of a different
religious denomination occupies places of high importance to the local population
(2010, p. 85). Pape (2006) based these conclusions on the analysis of a suicide
terrorism database he established. However, as Modghadam (2006) noted, Pape (2006)
made critical design errors and data omissions that shifted the data to support the
stated hypotheses. Pape (2010) maintained the argument that occupation causes
suicide terrorism based on a high correlation between the two, disregarding that some
of the groups that supported the argument (e.g., LTTE) ceased to exist, the absence of
any data analyzing sectarian violence within Muslim countries, the fact that statistically
a strong correlation does not indicate causality and the presence of confounding
variables, such as religion.
When the focus is on the victims, the phrase suicide terrorist is reconfigured to
homicide terrorist. It has been defined as “the deliberate death of others, the death of
the perpetrator being incidental to the act” (Khan, Goldney, & Hassan, 2010, p. 481).
Currently, the former term is preferred by most government and media public relations
outlets.
Force Multipliers
As the primary motivation of terrorist groups has shifted from secular (e.g.,
anarchism, anti-colonialism, and separatism) to religious, so have their organizational
foundations, strategies and tactics become more efficient and destructive. This change
was primarily facilitated by four force multipliers: technology, transnational support,
media, and religion (White, 2003). Force multipliers are defined as factors that allow
governments, terrorist groups and individuals (e.g., lone wolfs) to dramatically increase
their combat potential without simultaneously increasing their force strength, (DTIC,
n.d.; White, 2003).
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Technology
Technological developments in civilian and military industries over the past
century have changed the way people, organizations, businesses, and governments
understand their surroundings and conduct their daily business. Technological
advances, partly influenced by the cold war (arms) race, have not only brought the
development and proliferation of new weapon systems, including weapons of mass
destruction such as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents, but
also new means of transportation, communications, navigation, and the internet that
allowed for the creation of modern, interconnected and interdependent global
infrastructures and communications networks.
Technology allows for the worldwide exchange of people, goods, and
information, enabling social exchanges and opening new business opportunities.
Globalization, together with a post-World War II mindset, led to the creation of political
and economic unions (e.g., European Union) and trade areas that reduced border
checks and allowed the free flow of goods and people.
Current technology includes products on the market today that can be used for
both civilian and military purposes. These types of dual-use technologies include radio
controllers, satellite phones, global positioning systems (GPS), satellite imagery,
encryption software, etc. Although states (with some exceptions) have used technology
(including weapons) to preserve this way of life, terrorists have also embraced and
adapted technology to improve their operational and tactical operations. For example,
garage door openers or cell phones can be used to trigger improvised implosive devices
(IEDs), while the internet can - among other things - be used for recruitment, training
(by imitation), fundraising and money laundering, and to collect intelligence
(Bockstette, 2008; Weimann, 2004). In many cases, vulnerabilities of potential targets
can be identified by examining posted schedules, building and security plans, and
recognizing attack and escape routes by examining satellite and aerial photographs (e.
g., Google & Bing maps) available on the internet.
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Terrorists also found that social sites, such as Facebook, provide excellent
remote reconnaissance opportunities and so-called honey-traps. As a result, the Israel
Security Service noted that “terror organizations are using these sites to tempt Israelis
to meet up in person in order to either abduct them, kill them or recruit them as spies”
(Deitch, n.d.; IPT, 2010).
Although cybercrime and “hacktivism” (Weimann, 2005) have shown the
potential devastation cyber terrorism could cause, Stohl (2007) noted that no cyberattack so far has matched the description of cyber-terrorism. Post, et al. (2000) noted
that cyber terrorism is not a new concept. It was envisioned by the Italian Red Brigades
in their 1978 Strategic Directions Resolution. Further, Post, et al. (2000) found that the
1998 Milworm attack on the Indian Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) was an act
of cyber terrorism because it was politically motivated, targeted the digital information
systems, and intended to influence and coerce an audience to change their policy.
Although these technological advances allow individuals and societies to be more
productive, it also made them vulnerable to attack, as witnessed by the use of chemical
agents in the Tokyo subway attack (1995), attacks against the transportation
infrastructure in the Philippines (2004), Madrid (2004), and London (2005), and the
proliferation of technological advanced weapon systems from state sponsors to terrorist
organization, as witnessed in the attack on the INS Hanit (2006) by Hezbollah
(Hoffman, 1998; Lorenz, 2007). Technology has also played a vital role in the next two
force multipliers: transnational support and media.
Transnational Support and Operations
Transnational support or transnational operations is defined by White (2012) as
“the ability of terrorist groups to move and hide across nations” (p. 136) and to “strike
transnational economic targets” (p. 149). In an effort to increase operational security,
terrorist groups have found that the establishment of a foreign support base (with or
without the support of a state sponsor) provided them to the opportunity to organize,
train, and plan attacks in relative safety. Terrorists profited from the lack of an universal
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definition of terrorism, and the lack of global cooperation between law enforcement and
intelligence services (Hofman, 1998).
Support bases were established in areas where the terrorist group had a
constituency (e. g., Tamil Diaspora) and could raise funds through social pressure or
through criminal activities (Jayasekara, 2007). Transnational support bases also allow
terrorists to connect with other likeminded groups and exchange knowledge and
support, thus increasing their reach. Attacks on transnational economic targets such as
the tourism industry (Bali, 2002), oil industry (Iraq, 2006), and the transportation
industry (MV Limburg, 2002) displayed the vulnerabilities of the global economic system
and proved to be a means by which terrorists could influence policy making (Lorenz,
2007; White, 2012).
Media
The traditional public media (print, television, radio) has changed modern life
due to the technological revolution (Biagi, 2011). In a race for audience numbers,
media outlets publicize every aspect of life, including terrorism threats or attacks.
Modern digital media (e.g., websites) have exacerbated this race. Publishing
(uncensored) terrorist propaganda materials, such as video statements of terrorist
leaders that feature subtitles in the language of the targeted audience, in prime-time
news casts, provide terrorist groups the opportunity to not only to shape news coverage
but also to explain and justify their violence.
The inexpensive development and maintenance of websites, together with the
ability to publish multimedia content (i.e., video and audio recordings), in addition to
the written content, provides terrorists an additional means to directly reach their
intended audiences (Weimann, 2004). Therefore, the media plays an essential role in
the battle over the hearts and minds of people (i.e., propaganda) and in gaining soft
(i.e., tolerance) and hard support (i.e., practical assistance) for the terrorist groups.
The media has essentially introduced another avenue for terrorists to influence a
wider audience beyond their direct victims of an attack though the means of fear psychological warfare. Terrorist groups learned that some tactics generated more media
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coverage then others and thus they were more likely to imitate those in the future (i.e.,
contagion effect). Moreover, increased media coverage can be associated with a
subsequent increase in attacks; and vice versa, more attacks lead to more media
coverage (Hofmann, 1998; Ganor, 2005; White, 2003; Rohner & Frey, 2007).
Terrorist groups such as Hezbollah designed operations not to achieve traditional
military goals, but to have the maximum psychological impact. Messages addressed to
the enemy included speeches from terrorist leaders, videos of successful attacks and
beheadings and emphasized their determination in this long (and divine) struggle while
demonizing the enemy (Schleifer, 2006; 2009). This continues exposure through
internet and media outlets, resulting in additional psychological trauma, including
nightmares, anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), for victims
of terrorist attacks and regular viewers (Bockstette, 2008; Ganor, 2005; Rohner & Frey,
2007; Silke, 2011).
There are two classifications of fear within the realm of terrorism, rational and
irrational (Ganor 2005). An individual’s legitimate reaction to the chance of being
harmed, as calculated by the scope of the threat and the probability of its success, is
considered to be a rational fear. However, what is considered to be irrational fear (or
anxiety) is the event of a terrorist (or perceived terrorist) attack in which a person fears
for his/her own welfare (and/or that of his/her family) and therefore changes his/her
belief system (i.e., importance of national objectives). This irrational anxiety paralyzes
the individual and he/she cannot further contribute to society, which is the goal of the
terrorist organization. Therefore, the media plays an important role in the decision
making process of terrorist organizations and is considered one of four force multipliers.
The media is not only used by terrorists to address their enemy, but also their
home (i.e., constituencies) and neutral (3rd party) audiences. In any conflict, the party
that is able to maintain its constituency’s morale the longest has a higher chance of
success. Therefore, connecting with and reminding their audience of the cause and
justification for the violence and struggle is an important task for any terrorist
organization. Messages addressed to the neutral audiences often highlight the “unjust”
suffering or reasons for the attacks, hoping these 3rd parties will influence their enemy
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to give in, or give concessions (Schleifer, 2006; 2009). The importance of modern
international media networks and the internet to terrorist organizations becomes
apparent considering that prior to their appearance local and regional news stations
played only a subordinate role for terrorists. This is because the government was able
to control and censor their appearances (Bockstette, 2008).
Organizational structures
Terrorist groups in the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century featured a
hierarchical organization structure in which a charismatic leader maintained tight lines
of command and control. Due to its centralized operations (i.e., direct involvement of
the leadership in day to day decision making process), this organizational structure was
able to undertake long-term operations and conduct negotiations. However, hierarchical
(pyramid like) organizations also suffered from the constant need to communicate
commands between the different hierarchies (e.g., from top to bottom), large
resources, and a secure base to maintain its operation (Zelinsky, et al., 2006). Although
hierarchical organizations such as the former Irish Republican Army (IRA), the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), or Hezbollah tried to reduce their vulnerability
by restricting information and operational access of the lower cadres, the centralized
command and control structure were their Achilles’ heels, making them susceptible to
information interception which could lead to the targeted killing of their leadership and
the confiscation (i.e., loss) of centralized funding.
Although embracing the global transportation and communication networks to
move beyond the confinements of national borders to establish operational and support
networks abroad and to connect with like-minded people (e.g., based on issues,
ethnicity, or religious grounds), terrorist organizations found that security forces were
able to use technology formerly used to intercept communications during the cold-war
(e.g., ECHELON) or the Carnivore internet wiretapping program (post 1997) to intercept
and track their operations. Together with the displayed vulnerabilities and associated
costs of maintaining a hierarchical command and control structure, some terrorist
organizations (including Al Qaeda) morphed to decentralize their operations and
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resources. Similar to a brand (i.e., based on a common ideology), this organizational
structure features self-financed, loosely knit, and independently operating cells. This
organizational structure, together with ad-hoc cooperation and limited communication
between groups makes it difficult for security services to penetrate and disrupt these
kinds of decentralized terrorist networks (Zelinsky, et al., 2006; Zanini, et al., 2001).
The ability of terrorist organizations or networks to publish propaganda and
training materials via the internet provides the opportunity for self-radicalization and
training though imitation, and introduces a new facet to the counter-terrorism world,
which is homegrown terrorism. Although some try to connect with their terrorist
organization of choice and travel to current conflict areas, some homegrown terrorists
act as lone wolves and are therefore often difficult to identify and track because of their
pursuit of social isolation. Examples include: Younes Tsouli, also known as Irhabi 007
(i.e., Terrorist 007), a Moroccan-born resident of the United Kingdom who used
technical expertise to post propaganda materials, secure online communications, and
connected people with terrorist organizations, and
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Adebowale, two converts to Islam who in 2013 attacked and murdered Lee Rigby in
Woolwich, UK. These and other examples demonstrate the diversity of threats
(Kohlmann, 2008; SITE, 2013).
Despite the latest commotion caused by the revelation of the PRISM program by
the NSA (i.e., the collection of user information from different websites and online
services) and British Tempora program (interception of all communications going
through British sea cables by the GCHQ) though Edward Snowden, terrorists have long
known about the vulnerabilities of using electronic communications and the internet.
Katz and Raisman (2013) noted that in 2006 the Technical Mujahid Magazin released
recommendations on how to stay safe while using modern technology. Subjects
included the use of proxies, email encryption and data security. Similarly, the Global
Islamic Media Front (GIMF) released their first encryption program in 2007, the latest
version “Asrar al-Mujahideen 2” boasts modern anti-symmetric RSA 2048-bit encryption
reveling western programs (without the potential of a hidden backdoor). Other groups,
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such as the Technical Research and Studies Center, released guides on how to encrypt
cell phones as early as 2009 (Katz & Raisman, 2013).
Intelligence Cycle
The United States Intelligence system consists of 16 different organizations, each
having their unique priorities and outlooks on the challenges at hand. Although efforts
were made to foster cooperation between foreign and domestic intelligence
(Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004) that introduced the post of
director of national intelligence (DNI) and strove to blend law enforcement and
intelligence information in the form of fusion centers (DHS, 2008) and Joint Terrorism
Task Forces (JTTF), pooling different databases are still a work in progress due to the
lack of definition, rivalries between the different services, and restrictive U.S. laws.
However, with the estimated collection of over one billion pieces of raw data per day,
collaboration is essential in order to translate, analyze, and act on the information
collected (Hoffman, 1998; McConnell, 2007; Monahan, 2010).
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defined an intelligence cycle as the
“process of developing unrefined data into polished intelligence for the use of
policymakers” (FBI, n.d.). A process (see Figure 2) consist of five interdependent steps:
(1) planning of an intelligence operation, (2) collection of information via overt and
covert means, (3) processing of information including data entry, (4) analysis and
production (e.g., transforming raw data to intelligence), and (5) dissemination of
intelligence to the policymakers, based on requirements set forth by the director of
national intelligence (FBI, n.d.; CIA, 2013).
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Figure 2: Intelligence Cycle (Source: FBI)
Data Quality and Data Analysis in Intelligence
Data quality in part depends on the means by which it is being collected from
human and material sources. Due to the nature of such information the quantity and
quality of the raw intelligence differs widely.
Human Intelligence (HUMINT) describes the use of agents to: conduct
surveillance missions, infiltrate a target organization, develop a human source (i.e., a
mole) in the target organization, or persuade key personnel to defect. Information
collected from such missions is often limited and fragmented due to the counterintelligence efforts of the target organization. Knowledge of local languages, dialects
and customs is essential to develop HUMINT assets. Thus, HUMINT is often time
consuming and the quality of information must be constantly monitored and verified.
Furthermore, data entry mistakes caused by human factors can corrupt the information,
in addition, if information is available to parties not directly related to the intelligence
operation it could endanger the source (CIA, n.d.; Gilboa, 2012; Richelson, 2012)
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) consists of the interception of signals in form of
communications intercepts between people (COMINT, or communication intelligence),
or those of electronic signatures (ELINT, or electronic intelligence) which helps identify
and differentiate between different maritime vessels or aircrafts among others. SIGINT
installations, such as the U.S. ECHELON interception system or the Carnivore internet
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wiretapping program, resulted in a massive amount of information that needs to be
stored, decrypted, translated, and analyzed. Advances in cryptology and automated
language translations constrain SIGINT. Should a target discover he/she is
compromised, SIGINT can also be used to spread misinformation compromising the
quality or usefulness of information (Gilboa, 2012; Richelson, 2012).
Visual Intelligence (VISINT), together with Geo Spatial Intelligence (GEOINT)
and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), provide analysis with large amounts of detailed, high
resolution images of target areas. It can be used to identify (covert) installations, track
the movement of equipment and personnel, and provide real-time updates on the
battlefield. Storing and analyzing this information requires large amounts of computer
resources. Despite new and improved technology (e. g., nanoscale) and analytical
software that could limit distortions, interpretation is still primarily a human endeavor
(Gilboa, 2012; Richelson, 2012).
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) relies on public available information, and
must overcome two obstacles: information collection and analysis. Although well-known
OSINT sources such as governmental and business databases, newspapers, and
television stations are readily available, the internet and its undiscovered, un-indexed
and sometimes temporary Dark-Web offer a treasure trove of information (Chen, 2000).
Finding these sources often requires the creation of custom search bots that scour the
internet for hidden links. In its analysis it is important to be able to accurately identify
the source (e. g., author) and their political, social and economic views that could
influence how information is being presented. Moreover, each source needs to be
monitored and counter-checked and given a quality score to accurately qualify the
presented information (Gilboa, 2012; Richelson, 2012).
Quantitative analysis of intelligence data deals primarily with the analysis step of
the intelligence cycle. Data mining is an essential tool in intelligence analysis to discover
previously unknown patterns and relationships. Its usage can be impacted by mistakes
made during the collection and processing steps (e.g., data quality), interoperability
between different databases and analysis software, and privacy concerns (Seifert,
2007). Moreover, the time difference between analysis and a policy decision can lead to
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a disconnect between policy and the situation on the ground. Therefore, when dealing
with decayed data, analysts and policy makers should know whether and what impact
data decay has had on the analysis/decision making process.
Data Decay
Data decay is defined in this study as a combination of missing values (especially
censored data), corrupted data (including outliers), and faded (correlated less than 1.0)
data. Although each component has been previously identified and defined, no
comprehensive study exists that investigates the simultaneous impact of all three on
data analysis techniques used to explain or predict behavior, such as the general linear
model.
Missing Values – MAR, MCAR, MNAR
Missing data are often categorized as systematic, missing at random (MAR), or
missing completely at random (MCAR). Heitjan and Basu (1996), based on the definitive
work of Rubin (1976), defined MAR as the “probability of the observed missingness
pattern, given the observed and unobserved data, does not depend on the values of
the unobserved data” (p. 207). Ibrahim, et al. (2005) further described MCAR as “if the
failure to observe a value does not depend on any data, either observed or missing”
(page 333). Hair, et al. (2006) noted the distinction lies in the generalizability of the
data to the population (p. 56). In the case of MAR, values are missing randomly within
subgroups but are not representative of the population, while in the case of MCAR,
missing values are “indistinguishable from cases with complete data” (p. 57), and
therefore are considered completely at random.
Missing data fitting in neither missing at random or missing completely at
random category are considered to be systematic or missing not at random (MNAR).
Hence, missing values have distinct patterns that did not occur due to some random
process. Therefore, these missing values are considered to be non-ignorable missing
data; and can be found often in longitudinal studies with repeated measures (Hair, et
al., 2006; Ibrahim, et al., 2005; Little & Rubin, 2002). Possible methods of dealing with

34

missing values were described by Hair et al. (2006), Heitjan & Basu (1996), Ibrahim et
al. (2005), and Little & Rubin (2002). Techniques include complete cases (CC) analysis,
maximum likelihood (ML), multiple imputations (MI), fully Bayesian (FB), and weighted
estimating equations (WEE). According to all approaches, the listwise deletion of all
subjects with missing values is inefficient (Ibrahim et al., 2005).
Missing Values - Censored Data
Censored data are observations that are known to exist but are out of reach.
Therefore, censored data are another form of missing values (Hair, et al., 2006). As
noted by Cook (2008), the data are missing due to some reason unrelated to the
dependent variable. For example, consider a time series study on the impact of
attention deficient hypertension disorder (ADHD) on functional life skill outcomes of
students with disabilities. In most states, students with disabilities age out of the formal
educational system at 26 (or some similar legislated age). As a result, ADHD scores are
abruptly absent beginning with age 26, even though the (now) adults with disabilities
obviously continue to exist. The key component is that the age (26) is not related (or it
is random with respect) to the dependent variable of interest.
Research on the impact of censored data has especially been driven by survival
in clinical trials, as noted by Buckley & James (1979), Miller & Halpern (1982), and
Rabinowitz, et al. (1995). Three types of censoring exist: right censoring, left censoring,
and interval censoring.

Right censoring describes a situation in which data are unavailable after some
point in time. For instance, a subject is not observed anymore after a certain point in
time without the event of interest having occurred. This could be due to the death
(unrelated to the study) of the subject, the loss of the subject (e.g., moving, dropping
out), or because the study ended before the event of interest happened. Two types of
right censoring can occur: Type 1 describes a situation in which a study ends at a fixed
time without the occurrence of an event; Type 2 describes a situation in which a study
ends after a predetermined number of events occurred within the study group. In both
cases, the remaining study participants are right censored. Left censoring describes a
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situation in which data before a certain point are unavailable. In other words, an event
of interest has already occurred before the study onset, but the exact moment (e.g.,
date and time) is unknown. Interval censoring describes a situation in which the exact
time of an event is not known, but the interval in which the event happens is known
(Cook, 2008).
Miller and Halpern (1982) discussed four statistical analyses of censored data in
regression. They are the Cox estimator (1972), Miller estimator (1976), Buckley &
James estimator (1979), and the Koul, Susarla & Van Ryzin estimator (1981). They
concluded that “the Cox and Buckley & James estimators are the two most reliable
regression estimators for use with censored data” (p. 527). However, the Cox estimator
(1972) is not able to deal with data sets exhibiting both right and left censoring.
Simple Linear Regression
Regression is a valuable tool in predicting asset locations (Fiosina, 2012). Simple
Linear Regression (Eq. 1) is used to explain or predict. As with most parametric
methods, it has the following underlying assumptions: normality, homoscedasticity, and
linearity. It is easily extended to multiple independent variables; when the number of
dependent variables are increased to more than one the method is known as canonical
correlations, which is the statistical engine of discriminate function analysis (the
forerunner of logistic regression).
The violation of the assumptions may bring “undesirable repercussions”
(Sawilowsky & Markman, 1990, page 425). Bradley (1978) noted that “any violation of
a parametric test’s assumptions alters the distribution of the test statistic and changes
the probabilities of Type I and Type II errors” (p. 25). Hence, the presence of decayed
data will try the robustness of this procedure.
Resistant regression via Maximum Likelihood Methods
According to Ripley (2004), resistant regression “is about non-disastrous
behavior in the presence of incorrect data points.” A natural, initial solution to the
problem of noncompliant data in regression was developed in the early 1980s, which
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was to simply replace the arithmetic mean in Eq. (1) with the median. However, as with
all inferential techniques based on the median, this approach suffers from the sampling
distribution of the median is intractable, and the fact that sample median is not the
uniformly, best unbiased estimate of the population median (Shulkin & Sawilowsky,
2009). It is based on replacing the mean with M-estimators (maximum-likelihood), such
as the Huber (1981) or Tukey (1960) estimator. (For other approaches, such as the
Winsorized regression, see Wilcox, 1996, p. 324). Resistant regression can be
conducted in R via the rlm () subroutine.
Least-trimmed squares regression
Rousseuw and Leroy (1987) suggested the least trimmed squares regression as
an improvement over resistant regression. It is more resistant to outliers (Verzani,
2005, p. 100), because as opposed to accommodating outliers, it eliminates them.
Ripley (2004) noted that least trimmed squares is based on minimizing “the sum of
squares for the smallest q of the residuals,” where q takes on various values (e.g., S+
and R sets q to 90% as the default). The result is a regression model that maximizes
accuracy to the q% of data. The quantile squared residual...[with] floor((n+p+1)/2)“
(Ripley, n.d.), where n are data points and p are the regressors. lqs() is exact with one
regressor. For further details, see Fox (2002).
However, least trimmed regression is ill equipped to recover in the null case (i.e.,
no outliers when ordinary regression should have been used), because once data are
trimmed, they are removed from further calculations whether they should have been
eliminated or not. Least trimmed squares can be conducted in R via the lqs subroutine
in the MASS library.
Monte Carlo
Monte Carlo Simulation describes the “use of a computer program to simulate
some aspect of reality, and making determinations of the nature of reality or change in
reality through the repeated sampling” (Sawilowsky & Fahoome, 2003, p. 46), and was
first used on the Manhattan Project during World War II to simulate nuclear fusion
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(Spence, 1983). Although opinions differ to who invented of the computerized use of
Monte Carlo simulation, Spence (1983) credited S. Ulam, while Sawilowsky & Fahoome
(2003) credited Jerzy Newman. However, both agreed that Gosset (Student, 1908)
used similar techniques. Sawilowsky & Fahoome (2003) defined Monte Carlo as:
Repeated sampling from a probability distribution to determine the long
run average of some parameter or characteristic. Sampling is usually done
with replacement, meaning that a subset of scores are obtained, they are
analyzed, the results are recorded, and the scores are returned to the
reservoir of data values. On the next iteration, the values just examined
have the same probability of being selected as the values not yet
examined (p. 46).
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Chapter 3
Methodology
In order to explicate the impact of data decay on robust regression, a Monte
Carlo simulation will be conducted via the open source R programming environment.
The study will be conducted on a 2.2 Ghz AMD Athlon II P340 dual core computer. The
number of iterations per experiment will be set to 10,000 due to the speed obstacle of
R, which is an interpretive (as opposed to compiled) computing platform. This number
of repetitions is sufficient to produce Type I error accuracy to four digits (Robey &
Barcikowski, 1992).
Design
A simple linear regression layout will be used, defined as

Y =' a + β X 1 ,

(1)

where X1 represents the initial location of an asset, and Y ' represents the final location
of an asset.
Sampling Plan
Data will be obtained from R’s pseudo-random number command (i.e, rnorm),
using the built-in Marsalglia-Multicarry or Mersenne-Twister algorithms. The seed
subcommand will be left to the default to initialize the pseudo-random number
generator. Sample sizes will be set to n = 30, 90, 120, 240, and 480. The original data
will then be subjected to the three regression methods, which will yield the Type I and
II error rates.
Type I Error Model Definitions
Model 1. In this model, data will originate from a Gaussian distribution. They will
then be subjected to Type I right censuring, which means that data are unavailable
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after some point in time, either by predetermination or occurrence of some event. Right
censuring means data points are known to exist beyond a specific point, but they are
unavailable for some reason. This will be accomplished via truncation commands, set at
25% of censuring. (Due to symmetry, there is no need to also model left censuring in
this study.)
Model 2. In this model, data will be obtained from the Gaussian distribution, and
then subjected to a systematic amount of censuring from the middle of the data set. (In
the statistical literature, only right and left censuring is defined.) This will be
accomplished by removing the middle 25% of the data.
For example, consider the sample size of n1 = n2 = 30. First, pseudo-random
numbers will be obtained via R’s rnorm command, with thirty observations placed in
each of two arrays (or vectors as they are referred to in R). Using the matrix command,
the two arrays will be joined into a two-dimensional array (or two columns as they are
referred to in R). Then, the first column will be sorted from low to high, keeping the
original observation in the second column as its coordinate pair. Then, the final x and y
arrays will be created by selecting the paired x and y scores numbered 1-11 and 20-30.
The result will retain

11 + 11 22
=
or 73.33% of the original scores. This is as
30
30

close to a 25% censuring that can be obtained with the given sample size. Also, note
that if (a) the middle 25% of the original paired data were censured it would be
tantamount to reducing the sample size, and (2) if both x and y were sorted and then
the middle 25% of the original data were censured then r would be 1.0 instead of 0.
Model 3. In this model, systematically arbitrarily missing data will be obtained,
which is distinguished from randomly missing data in that the latter may not represent
any particular pattern of missingness, but nevertheless, occurs due to some random
process. This will be accomplished by deleting every other value.
Model 4. This model will be a combination of the previous three models. The
data will be subjected to center, right, and systematic censoring, in that order.
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Type II Error (comparative power) Model Definitions
Model 5. In this model, correlated data will be created via:

y =rx + z 1 − r 2

(2)

.

As a result, the descriptive statistics of correlated data will not be maintained between
X1 and Y values. (In order to preserve the mean, variance, skewness, kurtosis, and
higher moments, methods such as the Fleishman power method, see e.g. Headrick &
Sawilowsky, 1999, or the Gibbs sampler, see e.g. Casella & George, 1992, must be
used.) Censuring and missing data will be created via R commands.
Model 6. In this model, the X1 values will be obtained from a 4th generation
correlation produced from Eq. (2). In other words, Y will first be used to produce Xa, Xa
will then be used to produce Xb, Xb will then be used to produce Xc, and finally, Xc will
be used to produce X1 which will be used in the Monte Carlo simulation. By repeatedly
invoking Eq. (2), the descriptive statistics will accrue additional degeneration with each
iteration, while maintaining the post correlation to the set values of r = 0-1 (.2).
Analysis
In simple linear regression Eq. (2), β is a weighting coefficient. It is tested via a
N-2 df t test. The significance of t will be evaluated at the nominal

α = 0.05, 0.01, and

0.001 levels, using the ordinary least squares regression technique in R called lm().
Then, the same data will be submitted to the R’s lqs() and rlm() robust subroutines
from the MASS library, in order to conduct the least trimmed-squares and the resistant
regression.
The lqs () and rlm () routines produce the Y intercept, beta, and other summary
statistics. However, neither produces the p value associated with beta, which are
required to compare with the results from lm(). The lqs() provides beta, and its test of
significance will be discussed below. The rlm() provides the t test on beta, which will be
evaluated with the appropriate degrees of freedom to produce the associated p value.
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Also, because the maximum number of iterations to resolution in rlm() is “maxit = 20”,
it will be increased to “maxit = 1000” to help ensure the method resolves and to avoid
warning messages.
Standard error of beta and the lqs() method.
The t test is defined as beta divided by the standard error of beta (Brase &
Brase, 2013, p. 536; Mann, 1995, p. 667), which is then associated with the df = N – 2
for the t (or Z for large samples) distribution. It is generally not optimal to use the
normal theory formula for the standard error (i.e., the standard deviation divided by the
sample size) because it is not robust to non-normally distributed data (including
decayed data). There are potential alternatives, such as the winsorized sample standard
deviation, or a jackknife or bootstrap approximation (see, e.g., Sawilowsky & Fahoome,
2003, p. 22, 376 - 382). However, there are many limitations to those alternatives.
Wilcox (1996) provided alternatives in computing the standard error for other
hypothesis tests (e.g., the sample median), but that was only after he presented a test
using the robust estimator in the numerator combined with the normal curve theory
standard error in the denominator (see, e.g., p. 120). The same approach will be used
here, with the p value associated with beta obtained from lqs () determined via the
normal curve theory standard error (i.e., which is produced by the lm() routine).
Tabulation of Results
A template for the tabulation of Model 1 results to be compiled and presented in
Chapter 4 appears below:
Table X. Original Data; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 30; r = 0.0; 100,000 repetitions

α

lm()

Test
lqs()

rlm()

0.05
0.01
0.001
Similar tables will be produced for the other combinations of the sampling plan.
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Chapter 4
Results
Initially the research protocol called for 10,000 repetitions per experiment.
However, that number was too small to produce accurate Type I error results. The most
likely culprit is R’s rnorm pseudo-random number generator algorithm. Similarly, Eq. 2
failed to produce sufficiently precise correlations for small sample sizes (e.g., n1 = n2 =
30). Therefore, the number of repetitions per experiment was increased to 100,000. In
addition, the study was moved to an Intel Sandy Bridge i7-2600K 3.4GHz CPU-based
computer, with ultra-high speed Corsair Vengeance Low Profile 4x4GB RAM, Crucial M4
256GB solid state hard drive, and the Windows 7 Ultimate 64 bit operating system.
Nevertheless, confirming the well known lack of speed of the R platform, the results
compiled in each table in this chapter took more than 45 minutes to complete.
Using the standard error under lm(y ~ x) (i.e., beta associated with the ordinary
least squares regression) as the denominator for the test of beta obtained from lqs()
was unsatisfactory, with inflated Type I errors from between 7.3 and 104 times nominal
alpha, as noted in Table 1 below:

Table 1. Original Data; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 30; r = 0.0; 100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.04972
0.01041
0.00102

Test
lqs()
0.36455
0.21966
0.10248

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of robustness. Values in bold
exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of robustness.
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The next attempt was to improve the standard error used in lqs() by replacing
the original y values with the fitted values of y obtained from lqs(). In other words, the
standard error of the estimate (SEE, or residual standard deviation) was based on
n

∑i

SE E =

(y

− y ′)

2

, (3)

n −2

where y’ was obtained as fitted values from lqs() instead of the fitted values from lm().
The standard error of beta (SEb) is determined by

SE b =

n

SE E

(x i − x )
∑
i

. (4)

2

=1

Assembling the t test on beta as a ratio of beta divided by Eq. 4,

t =

b
, (5)
SE b

the obtained t is significant if

t obt ≥ t α
2

,n −2

.

Although, as noted in Table 2 there was improvement in the Type I error rates, the
inflation from between 5.8 and 39.4 times nominal alpha is not acceptable. (Note the
values for lm() differed slightly from those in Table 1 above due to the change in the
seed number.)
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Table 2. Original Data; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 30; r = 0.0; 100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.05029
0.01061
0.00109

Test
lqs()
0.29371
0.14499
0.04151

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of robustness. Values in bold
exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of robustness.

Regarding the least median squares (lms) option (i.e., “method = lms” option in
lqs (), which can be used to invoke a variety of robust methods), subsequent to a
Monte Carlo simulation Paranagama (2010) concluded, "In practice, the use of LMS is
limited by the absence of formulas for standard errors” (p. 35). This difficulty applies to
the default method (least trimmed squares), and hence, lqs() must be abandoned if the
purpose of conducting the linear model it to compute a t test on beta until an adequate
standard error for the least squares regression algorithm can be found. Therefore,
results in the balance of this chapter will be restricted to lm() and rlm().
Original Data Results
The Type I error results are compiled in Table 3 below. Note that the lm() are
slightly more accurate than the rlm(), but as expected both techniques produce the
correct Type I error rate for data obtained from the Gaussian distribution. As the
sample size increased from n1 = n2 = 30 to n1 = n2 = 480, both procedures’ Type I
errors converged with nominal alpha, as dictated by theory.
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Table 3. Original Data; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 30; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.04968
0.00955
0.00082

Test

rlm()
0.05377

0.01186
0.00144

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of robustness.
Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of robustness.

Table 4. Original Data; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 90; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.04988
0.01021
0.00103

Test
rlm()
0.05152

0.01095
0.00120

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of robustness.
Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of robustness.

Table 5. Original Data; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 120; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

Test
lm()
0.05057
0.01042
0.00103

rlm()
0.05119

0.01101
0.00113

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of robustness.
Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of robustness.
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Table 6. Original Data; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 240; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.04979
0.00977
0.00098

Test

rlm()
0.05004
0.00993

0.00115

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of robustness.
Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of robustness.

Table 7. Original Data; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 480; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.05002
0.01023
0.00093

Test
rlm()
0.05116
0.01051

0.00112

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of robustness.
Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of robustness.

Robustness with Respect to Type I and II Error
The balance of the tables in Chapter 4 pertains to the two error conditions, and
is presented without further comment. Type I error rates in this section are based on
decay models 1 through 4. Type II error rates (or comparative power), as represented
by decay and correlated models 5 and section, are complied in the following section.
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Type I Errors
Model 1 (Type I Right Censuring) Results
Table 8. Model 1; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 30; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.04979
0.01002
0.00000

Test

rlm()

0.05501
0.01305
0.00167

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of
robustness. Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of
robustness.

Table 9. Model 1; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 90; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions
Test

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.04979
0.00994
0.00109

rlm()
0.05162
0.01092

0.00127

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of
robustness. Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of
robustness.
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Table 10. Model 1; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 120; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions
Test

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.05008
0.00986
0.00098

rlm()
0.05132
0.01057

0.00115

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of
robustness. Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of
robustness.

Table 11. Model 1; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 240; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions
Test

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.05058
0.00963
0.00108

rlm()
0.05104
0.01012
0.00104

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of
robustness. Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of
robustness.

Table 12. Model 1; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 480; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.05005
0.00986
0.00105

Test
rlm()
0.04992
0.01012

0.00114

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of
robustness. Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of
robustness.
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Model 2 (Middle Censuring) Results
Table 13. Model 2; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 30; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.05087
0.01017
0.00089

Test

rlm()

0.05627
0.01334

0.00189

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of
robustness. Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of
robustness.

Table 14. Model 2; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 90; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.05020
0.00923
0.00086

Test
rlm()
0.05168
0.01043
0.00100

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of
robustness. Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of
robustness.

Table 15. Model 2; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 120; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.05091
0.00980
0.00000

Test
rlm()
0.05164
0.01045
0.00096

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of
robustness. Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of
robustness.
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Table 16. Model 2; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 240; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.05100
0.01030
0.00000

Test

rlm()
0.05048
0.01046
0.00098

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of
robustness. Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of
robustness.

Table 17. Model 2; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 480; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.04992
0.01020
0.00000

Test
rlm()
0.05007
0.01034
0.00104

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of
robustness. Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of
robustness.

Model 3 (Systematic Censuring) Results
Table 18. Model 3; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 30; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.05018
0.01030
0.00092

Test
rlm()

0.05959

0.01520
0.00239

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of
robustness. Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of
robustness
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Table 19. Model 3; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 90; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.04947
0.00988
0.00101

Test

rlm()
0.05246

0.01112
0.00120

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of
robustness. Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of
robustness

Table 20. Model 3; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 120; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.05032
0.01026
0.00103

Test
rlm()
0.05214

0.01121
0.00123

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of
robustness. Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of
robustness.

Table 21. Model 3; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 240; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.05009
0.00960
0.00078

Test
rlm()
0.05154
0.01008
0.00101

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of
robustness. Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of
robustness.
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Table 22. Model 3; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 480; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.04966
0.01002
0.00097

Test

rlm()
0.05049
0.01021
0.00098

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of
robustness. Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of
robustness.

Model 4 (Middle, Type I Right, and Systematic Censuring) Results
Table 23. Model 4; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 30; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.04953
0.01064
0.01064

Test
rlm()

0.07043

0.02168
0.00465

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of
robustness. Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of
robustness.

Table 24. Model 4; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 90; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.04935
0.01020
0.00086

Test
rlm()
0.05400

0.01208

0.00152

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of
robustness. Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of
robustness.
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Table 25. Model 4; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 120; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.05004
0.01020
0.00108

Test

rlm()
0.05356

0.01202

0.00153

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of
robustness. Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of
robustness.

Table 26. Model 4; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 240; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.04983
0.01035
0.00107

Test
rlm()
0.05128
0.01075

0.00121

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of
robustness. Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of
robustness.

Table 27. Model 4; Type I error rates for n1 = n2 = 480; r = 0.0;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.05017
0.01049
0.00122

Test
rlm()
0.05081
0.01038
0.00123

Note: Values in italics exceed Bradley's (1978) conservative definition of
robustness. Values in bold exceed Bradley's (1978) liberal definition of
robustness.
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Type II Errors
Model 5 (Correlated) Results
This series of tables pertains to the situation where the data are sampled from
the Gaussian distribution, but the X and Y data are correlation from .2 – 1 (.2), meaning
from .2 to 1.0 in increments of .2. This model represents the impact of an intervention
or treatment, meaning the tabled values are power results. Because the referent
distribution is Gaussian, the comparison of the values for rlm() with lm() are in
indication of the former’s robustness with respect to Type II errors, meaning because
the tabled entries are very similar, the beta error properties of rlm() are nearly as good
as the ordinary least squares regression.
Alternately, the two procedures are equally powerful under this study condition.
Note that as the correlation increases, the statistical power increases. At a certain point,
the combination of sample size and magnitude of correlation produces the maximum
rejection rate of 1.0.

Table 28. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 30; r = 0.2;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.18334
0.06103
0.01087

Test
rlm()
0.18141
0.06339
0.01259
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Table 29. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 90; r = 0.2;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.47783
0.24586
0.07715

Test

rlm()
0.46028
0.23212
0.07378

Table 30. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 120; r = 0.2;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.59674
0.35234
0.13455

Test

rlm()
0.57581
0.33257
0.12437

Table 31. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 240; r = 0.2;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.87995
0.70785
0.43245

Test
rlm()
0.86293
0.68081
0.40105

Table 32. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 480; r = 0.2;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.99323
0.96784
0.87289

Test
rlm()
0.99081
0.95940
0.84744
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Table 33. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 30; r = 0.4;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.60984
0.35693
0.12669

Test

rlm()
0.59052
0.34225
0.12552

Table 34. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 90; r = 0.4;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.97864
0.91943
0.74592

Test

rlm()
0.97207
0.90201
0.71245

Table 35. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 120; r = 0.4;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.99581
0.97876
0.90138

Test
rlm()
0.99456
0.97223
0.87971

Table 36. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 240; r = 0.4;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
0.99994
0.99950

Test
rlm()
0.99998
0.99991
0.99912
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Table 37. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 480; r = 0.4;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test

rlm()
1
1
1

Table 38. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 30; r = 0.6;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.95553
0.85578
0.61467

Test

rlm()
0.94610
0.83263
0.58465

Table 39. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 90; r = 0.6;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.99998
0.99996
0.99923

Test
rlm()
0.99999
0.99994
0.99858

Table 40. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 120; r = 0.6;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
0.99998

Test
rlm()
1
0.99999
0.99997
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Table 41. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 240; r = 0.6;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test

rlm()
1
1
1

Table 42. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 480; r = 0.6;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test

rlm()
1
1
1

Table 43. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 30; r = 0.8;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.99992
0.99921
0.99222

Test
rlm()
0.99983
0.99871
0.98810

Table 44. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 90; r = 0.8;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test
rlm()
1
1
1
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Table 45. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 120; r = 0.8;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test

rlm()
1
1
1

Table 46. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 240; r = 0.8;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test

rlm()
1
1
1

Table 47. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 480; r = 0.8;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test
rlm()
1
1
1

Table 48. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 30; r = 1;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test
rlm()
1
1
1
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Table 49. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 90; r = 1;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test

rlm()
1
1
1

Table 50. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 120; r = 1;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test

rlm()
1
1
1

Table 51. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 240; r = 1;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test
rlm()
1
1
1

Table 52. Model 5; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 480; r = 1;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test
rlm()
1
1
1
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Model 6 (4th Generation Correlation) Results
Table 53. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 30; r = 0.2;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
0.98124
0.92540
0.75067

Test

rlm()
0.97546
0.90968
0.71809

Table 54. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 90; r = 0.2;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
0.99997

Test
rlm()
1
1
0.99992

Table 55. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 120; r = 0.2;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test
rlm()
1
1
1

Table 56. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 240; r = 0.2;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test
rlm()
1
1
1
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Table 57. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 480; r = 0.2;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test

rlm()
1
1
1

Table 58. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 30; r = 0.4;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
0.99999
0.99995

Test

rlm()
0.99999
0.99999
0.99991

Table 59. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 90; r = 0.4;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test
rlm()
1
1
1

Table 60. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 120; r = 0.4;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test
rlm()
1
1
1
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Table 61. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 240; r = 0.4;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test

rlm()
1
1
1

Table 62. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 480; r = 0.4;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test

rlm()
1
1
1

Table 63. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 30; r = 0.6;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test
rlm()
1
1
1

Table 64. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 90; r = 0.6;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test
rlm()
1
1
1
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Table 65. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 120; r = 0.6;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test

rlm()
1
1
1

Table 66. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 240; r = 0.6;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test

rlm()
1
1
1

Table 67. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 480; r = 0.6;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test
rlm()
1
1
1

Table 68. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 30; r = 0.8;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test
rlm()
1
1
1
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Table 69. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 90; r = 0.8;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test

rlm()
1
1
1

Table 70. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 120; r = 0.8;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test

rlm()
1
1
1

Table 71. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 240; r = 0.8;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test
rlm()
1
1
1

Table 72. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 480; r = 0.8;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test
rlm()
1
1
1
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Table 73. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 30; r = 1;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test

rlm()
1
1
1

Table 74. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 90; r = 1;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test

rlm()
1
1
1

Table 75. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 120; r = 1;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test
rlm()
1
1
1

Table 76. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 240; r = 1;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test
rlm()
1
1
1
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Table 77. Model 6; Rejection rates for n1 = n2 = 480; r = 1;
100,000 repetitions

α

0.05
0.01
0.001

lm()
1
1
1

Test

rlm()
1
1
1
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Chapter 5
Conclusion

Terrorist attacks such as those on USS Cole (2000), Twin-Towers on 9/11
(2001), MV Limburg (2002), Super Ferry 14 (2004), Madrid train bombing (2004),

London tube bombing (2005), and the Boston marathon bombing (2013) with their
devastating loss of life, together with the new forms of asymmetric warfare displayed
by these groups, demonstrated the need for 1) better cooperation between security
services, and 2) the need to change or adapt data collection sources, patterns, and
analytic methods. Information is collected from various open and covert sources,
analyzed for important or predictive markers, and then acted on by the appropriate
security services.
According to Bamford (2012), automatic data interception and processing rates
have quadrupled to a rate of over 20 terabytes per minute, which required NSA to build
a new digital storage and processing facility in Utah with more than a million square
feet of digital storage and a cost of US $2 Billion. It is not surprising therefore, that
according to Monster.com the Homeland Security Industry is one of the fastest growing
governmental sectors today, with an overall increase of 311% jobs since 2001.
The quality of this massive warehoused Homeland Security data is often subject
to unspecified types of decay. As a result, it is not known how traditional statistical
methods, such as ordinary least squares regression (conducted via R’s lm() procedure),
will fare. To begin the experimental process of assessing standard quantitative
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methods, data sampled from a normal distribution should be subjected to various
models of decay, and if and only if the normal theory statistic performs appropriately
would it then be appropriate to consider decayed model originating from non-normally
distributed data. (In other words, if [linear] regression cannot survive decayed data
originating from normality, then there is no point if further complicating the study with
nonnormality. For comparison purposes, a plethora of robust methods, such as least
trimmed squares (via R’s lqs() procedure) and maximum likelihood regression (via R’s
rlm() procedure), have been developed, which hold promise to provide correct
statistical properties even when linear regression fails.
It is very important to be able to predict the location of assets, the movements
of material, or even the likelihood of certain targets being compromised. Similar abilities
pervade related disciplines, such as the prediction of man-made disasters. For example,
the safety of highway-rail grade crossings has been the subject of study for many
years. Prediction models abound in an attempt to reduce the likelihood of accidents
between trains and highway vehicles (Oha, Washington, & Doohee, 2006; Schoppert &
Hoyt, 1967).
In contradistinction to the relatively tame transportation data, the purpose of this
dissertation was to begin the process of determining how ordinary least squares
regression performs in the presence of massively decayed data presumed to applicable
to Homeland Security, and to begin answering the question if lqs() and rlm() provide
any advantages. This was accomplished by using R’s rnorm (normal) pseudo-random
number generator, after which data were subjected to various models of decay. Then,
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the three regression methods lm(), lqs(), and rlm() were applied; sample sizes set to n1
= n2 = 30, 90, 120, 240, and 480; and nominal α was set to 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001.
Four models of data decay were simulated in order to determine its impact on Type
I errors:
•

Model 1: 25% Type I Right Censuring

•

Model 2: 25% Center Censuring

•

Model 3: 25% Systematic Censuring

•

Model 4: 25% each of Center, Type I Right, and Systematic Censuring

Two models of data decay were simulated in order to determine its impact on Type
II errors (and comparative power):
•

Model 5: First generation correlated data, with r = .2 – 1 (.2)

•

Model 6: Fourth generation correlated data, with r = .2 – 1 (.2).

Initially, the study protocol called for repeating each Monte Carlo experiment 10,000
times, conducting lm(), lqs(), and rlm(), and testing β via a N-2 df t test. Immediately,
however, two issues arose. First, the number of repetitions, chosen in consideration of
R’s lack of speed, was insufficient to produce sufficiently precise Type I errors with nondecayed data obtained from R’s rnorm procedure. Hence, the decision was made to
increase the number of repetitions of each experiment to 100,000. As a result, the
decision was made to migrate the study from a 2.2 Ghz AMD Athlon II P340 dual core
machine to a 3.4 Ghz Intel Sandy Bridge i7-2600K CPU-based computer with ultra-high
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speed RAM. Nevertheless, the approximate time necessary to produce each table in
Chapter 4 was 45 minutes.
Second, it was immediately discovered that an appropriate standard error has not
been derived for the lqs() method. Because the t test on β requires the standard error,
various options were considered: (1) the p value associated with β obtained from lqs ()
was determined via the normal curve theory standard error via the lm() procedure,
which failed because it produced Type I errors as large as 104 times nominal α, and (2)
the standard error was obtained by replacing the original y values with the fitted values
of y obtained from lqs(), which was an improvement, but also failed because it
produced Type I errors as large as 39.4 times nominal α.
Because of this failure, even though the various resources cited in Chapter 2 use it
to produce pretty regression equations, lqs() was omitted from further consideration in
this study. Although the ability of this method to create a regression line that visually
fits data with decay better than lm(), that feature is immaterial because the method is
dangerous in not being even close to robust with respect to Type I errors. The lack of a
robust test of beta in lqs() regression will become increasingly serious as applied
researchers continue to be attracted to its highly publicized robustness regression lines
and implement it into their applied work. For example, lqs() was used by Fan, Lub,
Madnickc, and Cheungd (2001) in a study on data integration in information systems,
Abo-Khalil and Abo-Zied (2012) in a study of sensorless control of wind turbines, and
Gidnaa and Domínguez-Rodrigo (2013) in a study of human femoral length from
fragmented specimens.
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Discussion
Type I Errors
Normally Distributed Data
For the reasons outlined above, the discussion of lqs() will be omitted, because
in the absence of an appropriate standard error, it produced wildly liberal Type I error
rates.

For the original data, regardless of the sample size, both lm() and rlm()

produced correct Type I errors. R’s rlm() produced trivially larger Type I error rates, but
the results were well within Bradley’s (1978) conservative definition (i.e., ±.1α) of
robustness.
Decayed Data
There was no impact on lm() when the data were subjected to 25% Model 1
(right censuring) decay. However, for the smallest sample size (n1 = n2 = 30), rlm()
produced Type I error rates that exceeded Bradley (1978) conservative definition of
robustness. For example, with α = 0.05, the Type I error rate rose to 0.055. With α =
0.001, the Type I error rate rose to 0.0017, exceeding Bradley’s (1978) liberal standard.
However, with sample sizes of n1 = n2 = 90 or larger, rlm() produced correct Type I
errors. Hence, rlm() should not be used with right censuring for small sample sizes.
The same pattern of Type I errors was repeated with Model 2 (center censuring)
decay, except the inflations were slightly larger for rlm() (e.g., 0.0596 and .0024,
respectively), and with Model 3 (systematic censuring) (e. g., 0.05959 and 0.00239,
respectively). In the presence of massive decay as represented by Model 4 (center,
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right, and systematic), rlm() nearly exceeded Bradley’s liberal definition (i.e., ±.5α) of
robustness for the largest alpha levels and exceeded that standard for smaller alpha
levels. For sample size of n1 = n2 = 30, with α = 0.05, the Type I error rate rose to
0.0706, and with α = 0.001 the Type I error rate rose to 0.00465. With sample size n1
= n2 = 90 and α = 0.05, rlm()’s Type I error rate was barely inside Bradley’s
conservative definition (0.054), but with α = 0.01, its Type I error rate excluded the
liberal standard (0.00152). The Type I error rates displayed the same pattern for the
remaining pattern for the remaining sample sizes. Hence, in the presence of massive
decay as modeled by a combination of various types of censuring, rlm() should not be
used with extremely small nominal alpha levels if the intent to meet Bradley’s (1978)
conservative definition of robustness.

Type II Errors (and Comparative Power)
In order to examine Type II error properties of lm() and rlm(), the data were
subjected to two models of correlation: first and fourth generation of correlation, with
the magnitudes of correlation spanning from r = .2 to 1 in increments of .2. As the
correlation increases between X and Y in linear regression, the statistical significance of
β increases. (Note that if Y represents group membership, such as belong to one
terrorist group vs. another, is regressed on X, this is known as dummy coded regression
and is equivalent to the ordinary independent samples t test.)
The first step in a comparative Type II error study is to determine if the
competing statistics reject at the same rate for a given treatment alternative. The
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second step is to determine the Type II error studies proceed to determine how the
competing tests perform (i. e., if they obtain the same rejection rate if the data are
sampled instead from a nonnormal distribution). Comparative power studies, a third
step, are more comprehensive in modeling the treatment alternative throughout the
power spectrum. However, the current study was restricted to first step, which was to
sample data from a normal distribution and then apply the various models of decay to
it. The treatment alternative was restricted to modeling various levels and types of
correlated data.
Regardless of the model (first or fourth generation of correlated data), sample
size, or magnitude of correlation, the Type II error results (i.e., rejection rates) were
nearly equivalent for lm() and rlm(). This is somewhat surprising for sample size of n1 =
n2 = 30, because rlm()’s inflated Type I error should have given it

a slight, albeit

inappropriate, advantage. Overall, though, these two procedures performed nearly
identically.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the least trimmed squares (R’s lqs() procedure) should be
avoided, despite the pretty regression lines it produces, until such time that an
appropriate standard error can be developed. In terms of the Type I error performance
of ordinary least squares regression (via R’s lm() procedure) and maximum likelihood
regression (R’s rlm() procedure), when data are massively decayed as modeled by
various types of censuring, rlm() should be avoided with sample sizes as small as n =

75

30 per group. In terms of Type II errors, however, the two procedures perform nearly
identically. Interestingly, although it is known that the ordinary least squares (lm())
regression can be impacted by non-normality and other assumption violations, it is
remarkable robust to normally distributed data that is subject to massive decay.

Implications for Further Research
R’s lqs() might become a suitable substitute for lm() if further work on finding a
better standard error is successful. As noted above, suggestions have been made to use
a jackknife or bootstrap approach. However, those techniques are computationally
intensive, add a layer of error because there are estimates, and would only be
appropriate for the data at hand. Obviously, at such time that the statistical literature is
settled on a robust standard error to use with lqs() this study should be replicated using
it to determine the p value associated with beta.)
It was concluded that the Type I error rate for rlm() was unacceptable for a
sample size of 30 per group. If Bradley’s (1978) liberal definition of robustness is
acceptable, rlm() is useful when the sample size reaches 90 per group for the larger
alpha level of 0.05. Based on the study parameters, however, the precise point after 30
and before 90 per group when rlm() is acceptable is not known, which would require
additional study.
Because rlm() does not perform in an acceptable fashion when data are sampled
form a normal distribution, it is pointless to continue promoting this method when data
are obtained from nonnormal data. In terms of man-made disasters (i.e., highway-rail
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accidents), Lord and Mannering (2010) considered sixteen non-linear prediction
approaches: Poisson, Negative binomial/Poisson-gamma, Poisson-lognormal, Zeroinflated Poisson and negative binomial, Conway–Maxwell–Poisson, Gamma, Generalized
estimating equation, Generalized additive, Random-effects, Negative multinomial,
Random-parameters Bivariate/multivariate, Finite mixture/Markov switching, Duration,
Hierarchical/multilevel, Neural network, and Bayesian neural network and support
vector machine. Further study using those approaches may prove beneficial in the
presence of the massively decayed data that is presumed to be present in Homeland
Security data.
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Homeland Security, sponsored by governmental initiatives, has become a vibrant
academic research field. However, most efforts were placed with the recognition of
threats (e.g. theory) and response options. Less effort was placed in the analysis of the
collected data through statistical modeling. In a field that collects more than 20
terabyte of information per minute though diverse overt and covert means and indexes
it for future research, understanding how different statistical models behave when it
comes to massively decayed data is of vital importance.
Using Monte Carlo methods, three regression techniques (ordinary least squares,
least-trimmed, and maximum likelihood) were tested against different data decay
models presumed to be found in homeland security research studies in order to test
whether these techniques will preserve the Type I error rate in the t-test of
standardized beta.
The results of these Monte Carlo simulations (sample size n=30,90,120,240,480
and 100,000 iterations) showed that the least trimmed squares method should be
avoided under any circumstance due to the lack of a defined standard error, while the
maximum likelihood technique should be avoided with smaller sample sizes due to the
inflated Type I errors. Interestingly, although it is known that the ordinary least squares
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regression can be impacted by non-normality and other assumption violations, it is
remarkable robust to normally distributed data that is subject to massive decay.
Keywords: Homeland Security, Analysis, Data Decay, Monte Carlo, Regression

91

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT
Akiva Joachim Lorenz received his Bachelor of Arts in Government (Cum Laude)
in 2007 from the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel. Specializing in Security and
Intelligence Studies, Akiva Lorenz utilized his academic knowledge working for several
think tanks, including the Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT). His research and policy
papers were published by the United Nations, Intelligence Libraries, and are used by
entities such as the Defense Academy of the UK in their Command and Staff Courses.
During that time, data analysis has become an important factor in his life, resulting in
the pursuit of his Doctor of Philosophy in Evaluation and Research (EER) at Wayne
State University. During his doctoral studies, Akiva Lorenz received six academic awards
for excellence including Wayne State’s Graduate Research Fellowship. Akiva Lorenz has
since applied his statistical and analytical skills also to the marketing and real estate
fields as a licensed Realtor®. Currently, Akiva Lorenz is the President of Optimal Leads
Inc., a consulting firm, and teaches as adjunct/part time faculty at several universities.

